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Abstract
This study examines the complexity of citizens’ political affectivity in Turkey. Drawing from componential models of affect,
we rely on situational (motive consistent versus inconsistent) and motivational state (gain or loss) appraisals to test hy-
potheses on systematic differences in the clusters of political affect that span beyond the traditionally measured discrete
emotional reactions of anger, hope, pride and fear. Using qualitative interview data from 2012, we develop a topography
of affect clusters and systems of associations between political concepts. We find citizens express their emotionality in rich
terms. They are linked to appraisals of multiple political objects, they reflect aversive, anxious, loss and gain oriented emo-
tional responses, and they are guided by citizens’ ideological orientations. This study is valuable as it addresses a significant
gap in the study of political affect going beyond their discrete categorizations. It introduces a mapping methodology as an
effective way of capturing the complexity of affect systems, and it reveals powerful insights into the depth and richness of
emotions based on appraisal dimensions, enriching our understanding of political tensions and developments in Turkish
politics and beyond.
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1. Introduction
This study examines the complex affectivity of politi-
cal orientations in Turkey. Recent developments in this
deeply divided societymake it an excellent place to study
political affect. During the Gezi protests in 2013 diverse
segments of the public came to the streets against the
AKP’s authoritarian system of governance; calling for so-
cial justice against the increasing restrictions on individ-
ual rights and freedoms (Bee, 2017; Öniş, 2015). TheGezi
movement brought together people from diverse back-
grounds, who shared individual grievances and hopes,
fears and frustrations, and appeared to overcome ideo-
logical boundaries that traditionally set them apart (Bee
& Kaya, 2017; Chrona & Bee, 2017; Göle, 2013; Öniş,
2015; Özdemir, 2015).
Expressions of anger, fear, hope, frustration and
pride during that time were frequent in interpersonal
interactions, social media and various online blogs1. In-
ternational news and academic studies reported on the
raised levels of emotionality in Turkish politics but the dis-
cussion of these emotions took for granted their origins
and content (BBC, 2013;Mullen & Cullinane, 2013; Odağ,
Uluğ, & Solak, 2016). In an original set of studies, Erisen
1 See Facebook groups Gezi Solidarity, Diren Gezi Parki and Taksim solidarity, and Twitter hashtags #direngeziparki, #occupygezi, #direnturkiye,
#direnistanbul #direndunya, #direnankara, #direnizmir, #DuranAdam which hosted Gezi related tweets.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 144–158 144
(2013, 2017) tested the impact of anger, fear and enthu-
siasmon public attitudes of Turkish citizens towards their
leaders, least liked groups in society, social mobilization,
and risk perception related to ISIS and Syria. He found
that these emotions were responsible for changes in cit-
izens’ ‘risk assessments, threat perceptions, policy eval-
uations, information seeking, premiership approval and
performance evaluations’ (2013, p. 131). These findings
highlight the value of the study of emotions in Turkey
and generate new pressing questions. What gave rise to
these emotions?What did these emotions ‘mean’ for the
citizens that experienced them, and to which considera-
tions were they attached? As we cannot assume a ‘com-
mon citizen’ reacting to political events, we also should
not assume common experiences of anger, fear, hope
or pride. Their content should be investigated to under-
stand the origins of political actions and reactions.
Our study uses qualitative in-depth interview data
from 2012 in Turkey to provide valuable insights on cit-
izens’ affective experiences. Because these experiences
are rich, fluid and ever changing, we prefer the ana-
lytical category of affect, which contains emotions, but
also moods, feelings, sentiments, and emotional traits
(Capelos & Demertzis, 2018; Thagard, 2012). We explore
under what conditions they arise and assist individuals
to make sense of politics. We also take into account ide-
ological dispositions to examine citizens’ differential ac-
counts of political events. As we show, uncovering the
origins of political affectivity allows us to appreciate vari-
ation in political action and reaction. Our approach can
be extended to examine the affective profile of recent
spikes in unconventional participation or the controver-
sial electoral outcome of 2018 in Turkey which has been
characterized as following a downward turn to author-
itarianism (Chrona & Capelos, 2017; Esen & Gümüşçü,
2017; Tansel, 2018; White & Herzog, 2016).
2. Modelling Affective Experiences: Complex Reactions
beyond Anger and Fear
Affect is one of the three mental functions alongside
cognition and motivation (Reber, 1985, p. 15). As a gen-
eral term affect is often used interchangeably with emo-
tions but in essence affect is a fundamental functional
category that concerns or arouses the emotional root
of judgements and beliefs (Barrett, 2006). It is impor-
tant to understand affective processes because together
with cognition they drive thinking and decision-making
(Damasio, 1994; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes,
1986; Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Emotions, feelings, senti-
ments and moods are all affect types combining cog-
nitive appraisal and psychological perception (Thagard,
2012). Emotions, like love, hate, anger, fear, hope and
pride are acute and momentary expressions of affect,
which originate from cognitive appraisals and evalua-
tions of the environment; they are bound to social expec-
tations, and result in physiological changes that prepare
an individual for action (Capelos, 2013).
In contrast to moods, which usually last longer, emo-
tions are brief and distinct affective experiences. In ad-
dition, emotions are directed towards something, while
moods are general and can have combined sources. Feel-
ings refer to our conscious experience of our emotions
but at times they can also be imperceptible. Sentiments
(our likes and dislikes) and emotional traits last longer,
but sentiments are directed towards an object while
traits are personality characteristics and are generally di-
rected at the world (Damasio, 2003; Frijda, 1994).
The spectrum of our affective experiences is ap-
proached by theories of basic emotions which identify
a set number of discrete emotions each with distinctive
patterns, like anger joy, fear, enthusiasm; by circumplex
model theories (Russell, 1980) which propose the clas-
sification of affect along two key dimensions of arousal
and valence; and componential models (Frijda, 1986)
that see emotions sharing particular configurations on
appraisal dimensions which can be grouped together
(Ekman, 2003). Barrett (2006) points out that the bound-
aries between similarly-valenced discrete emotions are
not as distinct as is usually assumed. Emotions fit a com-
bination of appraisal clusters, which share co-relational
themes (Lazarus, 1991).
Componential models explore these themes further
and offer a topography of affect. The key mechanism for
the elicitation of different emotions are the appraisals
of the event as motive inconsistent or consistent (situ-
ational state), whether it involves a punishment or re-
ward (motivational state), whether it is uncertain or cer-
tain (the event’s probability), whether it is perceived as
weak or strong (power) whether its negative or positive
outcome is deserved (legitimacy) and whether the event
is caused by circumstances, another person or the self
(agency) (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990;
Scherer, 2005). Emotions are linked to combinations of
appraisals (Scherer, 1984) and can bind together in affec-
tive clusters (Ekman, 2003).Motive inconsistent affect in-
volves aversive emotions like anger and irritation which
arise as response to the appraisal of an event seen as
obstruction or infringement to reaching a goal or sat-
isfying a need, with a possible action tendency to at-
tack (Scherer, 2001). They also involve fear, worry and
anxiety, the anxious affectivity cluster which unlike aver-
sive affect, are generated in situations involving threat,
demonstrating the tendency to withdraw to avoid con-
tact (Frijda, 2004). Motive inconsistent is also affect gen-
erated in situations where the opportunity to obtain a
reward is either lost or absent, experienced as sadness
and disappointment (Sabini & Silver, 2005). Motive con-
sistent joy and pride are elicited when the motivational
appraisal of an event is beneficial, reward eliciting,within
reach and deserved. Motive consistent situations with
uncertain outcomes linked to the anticipated termina-
tion of a motive inconsistent event are experienced as
hope (Roseman et al., 1990).
The study of appraisals raises the question of the tem-
poral primacy of emotion versus cognition, which is dif-
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ficult to settle. While some scholars assume the impact
of emotions on evaluations of concepts, others note that
the arrows can point inward, where the appraisals of con-
cepts give rise to the emotions (Clore & Ortony, 2000). In
addition, Lazarus, Kanner and Folkman (1980) note the
high level of fluidity of affect: the same event may be
appraised and reappraised in different ways over time,
producing differing affective experiences. To complicate
matters further, the experience of specific, distinct emo-
tions arises partly from cultural knowledge about emo-
tions (Barrett, 2006). This links to studies that show that
emotions implicate social experiences and are the result
of social interaction (Hochschild, 1979). Socially enacted
emotions like compassion, embarrassment, shame, hu-
miliation and guilt concern our personal identity as it re-
lates to others. We also experience collective emotions
that involve our social identity and generate shared ex-
periences, strengthen social bonds but can also carve
out rigid boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Collec-
tive emotions are experienced in the plural, and like
individual emotions, take specific expressions of anger,
shame, pride, hope, fear and disappointment (Hatfield,
Caccioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Rime, 2007; Ross, 2014).
Moreover, the ‘me’ and the ‘us’ are interconnected as
they arise from our interactions with the social and po-
litical environment (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007;
Capelos, Exadaktylos, Chrona, & Poulopoulou, 2018; Jost,
Nam, Amodio, & Van Bavel, 2014).
3. Complex Political Affectivity and Citizens’
Preferences
The above highlights that our experience of affect in pol-
itics, in other words our political affectivity, is dynamic,
relational, ambivalent and often contradictory (Capelos,
2013; Demertzis, 2013). Individual, social and collective
political experiences give rise to discrete emotions, but
also moods, feelings and sentiments, which often bind
together as individuals describe how they feel. When
we only measure citizens’ individual discrete emotions
and their effect on political decisions, we take a nar-
row approach that ignores the links between the expe-
rience of clusters of emotions and their associated cogni-
tive representations. Our starting hypothesis is that affec-
tive experiences emerge from a variety of political con-
cepts. Although moods, sentiments and feelings are of-
ten sidestepped in the examination of political affectiv-
ity due to themethodological domination of instruments
that focus on discrete emotion measures, we postulate
that citizens’ political affectivity is richer and broader
than quantitative survey accounts can capture. Hence,
we test this hypothesis by using qualitative data, focus-
ing on two key appraisal dimensions (situational and mo-
tivational state). Our analyses identify clusters of emo-
tions, moods and feelings and their interconnections
with salient political concepts that make up citizens con-
siderations about politics.
Our first hypothesis is that aversive affectivity like
anger, disgust, annoyance, or frustration will be asso-
ciated with negative reactive attitudes towards politi-
cal objects (Capelos, 2013). Aversive affectivity carries
discontent and punishment related tendencies and pro-
motes action without much deliberation. Anxious affec-
tivity such as worry, uneasiness and fear is associated
with avoidance and risk aversion behavioural patterns
with the aim to reduce exposure to the source of anxi-
ety so our second hypothesis is that it will relate to con-
cepts that denote exposure to stressful stimuli but not
inspire action. Third, in accordance with studies in psy-
chology, we expect that sadness and disappointment will
be related to the activation of memories of other mis-
fortunes and failures and to ebbing away from any urge
towards action (Frijda, 1994). Enthusiasm, joy and pride
generate participatory practices and trust towards insti-
tutions, hope promotes altruism, and combined with ef-
ficacy promotes action readiness. Our fourth hypothesis
is that pride will be observed when events are appraised
as motive consistent and reward eliciting, and hope will
be observed with the anticipated termination of motive
inconsistent events (Capelos, Katsanidou, & Demertzis,
2017; Ekman, 2003; Frijda, 1986).
4. Ideological Orientations as Drivers of Political
Affectivity
Different people in the same situation feel different emo-
tions (Roseman et al., 1990). We therefore look beyond
individual preferences to ideological orientations to un-
derstand differentiation in the sources of affectivity. Po-
litical ideology, being an externally generated, socially
shared system of competing beliefs about the way so-
ciety should function, structures individual thinking and
responses, which in turn influence social and political re-
ality (Conover & Feldman, 1984; Converse, 1964; Lane,
1962; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Ideological
orientations serve as foundations of individuals’ men-
tal structures: a pool of connotations that links motive
consistent evaluations with preferred ideological inclina-
tions, and motive inconsistent ones with least-preferred
ideological principles (Markus & Zajonc, 1985).
In Turkey, the ideologies of Kemalism and political Is-
lamdominate the socio-political structure2. The Kemalist
inheritance advocated by centre-left CHP, embedded
in the Constitution the secular and modern driven na-
ture of Turkey. The neoliberal version of political Islam,
advocated since 2002 by AKP, has tried to reconcile
modernity and a version of conservative neoliberalism
with Islamist principles (Ciddi, 2009; Gülalp, 2001; Kaya,
2015; Özbudun, 2006; Somer, 2007; Uyusal, 2011; Yavuz,
2006, 2009).
2 Political Islam and Islamism refer to the political connotation of Islam and influence of religion in the socio-political arena. Political Islam is ‘a form of
instrumentalization of Islam by those pursuing political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future,
the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic tradition’ (Denoeux, 2002, p. 61).
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The nature of the ideological changes of the main ad-
vocators of political Islam and Kemalism have been thor-
oughly examined (Çarkoğlu, 2002, 2007; Taniyici, 2003;
Yavuz, 2006). In addition, public opinion research offers
complex models that point to the long-standing effects
of the existing dichotomies and social cleavages as well
as factors that shape citizens’ electoral choices and polit-
ical behavior such as centre vs. periphery, left-right ide-
ology, political values, core personal values, economic
considerations, education, interest and knowledge and
ethnic and collective identity (Akarca & Tansel, 2007;
Arikan, 2013; Başlevent, Kirmanioğlu, & Şenatlar, 2009;
Çarkoğlu & Hinich, 2006; Çarkoğlu & Kalaycioğlu, 2007;
Erdoğan & Uyuan-Semerci, 2017; Ergünder, 1980–1981;
Erisen, 2016; Esmer, 2002; Kentmen-Çin, 2015; Mardin,
1973; Toros, 2014; Yilmaz, Sarıbay, Bahçekapılı, & Harma,
2016). However the interplay between ideological orien-
tations and political affectivity has been underexplored
in the Turkish context. Our hypothesis here is thatmotive
consistent affectivity such as hope and pride will occur
for concepts (parties, actors and issues) which align with
an individual’s system of beliefs. We also expect that mo-
tive inconsistent affectivity expressed as anger, frustra-
tion, disappointment, sadness, fear, worry, anxiety and
uneasiness, will arise with concepts that contradict ideo-
logical inclinations.
5. Methodology
To test the above hypotheses, in-depth interviews were
conducted in Istanbul with native Turkish citizens be-
tween July and September 2012 using snowball sam-
pling3. Thirty-eight participants from diverse educa-
tional and socio-economic backgrounds were invited
and twenty-five agreed to participate4. The interviewer
spoke Turkish and English fluently and fourteen partici-
pants chose to speak Turkish while eleven opted for En-
glish, switching to Turkish as needed. The average dura-
tion of the interviews was 1 hour and 25 minutes and
the overall duration of the recordedmaterial was approx-
imately 32 hours.
At the start of the interview a short survey mea-
sured demographics and ideological placement on three
7-point scales (Kemalism vs. political Islam, left vs. right
orientations, and liberalism vs. conservatism) and par-
ticipants were invited to discuss their responses. As the
interview progressed to a general discussion of politics,
participants were askedwhatmade them feel as they did
when they mentioned affect terms (discrete individual
or collective emotions, moods, sentiments and feelings).
We recorded their responses verbatim and identified the
specific affect mentions.
Next we grouped affect items together in five
clusters-families based on their key appraisal dimensions
(situational and motivational state): motive consistent
gain-related pride, joy, satisfaction, and admiration;mo-
tive consistent loss-avoidance related hope, expectation
and anticipation; motive inconsistent aversive affectiv-
ity with expressions of anger, frustration, rage and irrita-
tion; motive inconsistent anxious affectivity with expres-
sions of fear, worry, concern, uncertainty, and insecurity;
andmotive inconsistent loss-related disappointment, dis-
trust, dismay, sadness, and pessimism. Based on our hy-
potheses we anticipated patterns in the concepts that
were mentioned in reference to these emotions.
We organized the data using a variant of Cognitive
Affective Maps (CAMs), which displays in diagrams the
conceptual and emotional structure of people’s views
(Homer-Dixon, Milkoreit, Mock, Schroder, & Thagard,
2014)5. CAMs are used in psychology, cultural anthropol-
ogy, sociology and political science, to describe cultural
thought and action-potential for individuals and groups
(Thagart, 2012)6. We created a master map (Figure 1)
with concepts mentioned in relation to how participants
felt about politics, and maps for each of the five affec-
tive clusters highlighting only the concepts mentioned in
relation to the cluster (Figures 2 to 6).
Because our aim was to test hypotheses regarding
the rich cognitive explanations of political affectivity (be-
yond positive and negative affect), our maps divert from
traditional CAMs in three ways. First, the main frames
are the affective clusters, so instead of identifying va-
lence between concepts, the specific affective clusters
are linked with the concepts that gave rise to them. The
maps represent themain affect frame as the platform on
which the related concepts are activated (rather than us-
ing lines to connect shapes). Second, our maps do not
provide a comprehensive account of concepts related to
Turkish politics. Instead, we focused on concepts associ-
ated with how participants felt about politics. Third, our
maps do not account for associative strength because it
was not possible to assess this reliably from our qualita-
tive interviews.
3 Snowball sampling (non-probability) relies on referrals from initial subjects to identify hard-to-reach subjects, when materials are sensitive. Snowball
and respondent-driven samples can provide asymptomatically unbiased estimates (Salganik & Heckathorn, 2004; Snijders, 1992).
4 Of the 25 participants, 20 (80%) were 18–29 years old and 5 (20%) were 30–49 years old; 14 were men (56%) and 11 were women (44%); most were
employed in the private sector (tourism, private tutors, bank, school teachers) and 2 unemployed; 88% obtained or were studying for an undergraduate
or postgraduate degree and 12% had a high school degree; 64% were middle class, 20% upper-middle, and 16% lower- middle; 60% voted for CHP, 24%
for AKP voters, 8% for MHP and 8% for TKP.
5 CAMs visualize citizens’ cognitive and affective conceptual structures (Homer-Dixon et al. 2014; Thagard & Findlay, 2014). The main frames (key con-
cepts) connect into a network that represents systems of beliefs, with links highlighting complex associations. Changes in associative strength (weak or
strong) vary the thickness of the line that connects the main frames, and changes in valence (positive or negative) vary the colour of shapes (green for
positive, red for negative). CAMs track the affective framework tagged to the respective cognitive process and allow for the evaluation of emotional
coherence bymodelling the associative power of positive and negative values, which can change or remain constant across individuals (Thagard, 2006).
6 CAMs have been used in small-N studies (see Wolfe, 2011, interviews with 25 participants), as well as analyses of negotiations and documents (see
Findlay & Thagard, 2014; Homer-Dixon et al., 2014).
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6. Findings
Our overall hypothesis was that affect is experienced in
a variety of complex and fluid formulations rather than
a handful of emotions like anger, fear or hope. In our in-
terviews we identified 259 affect mentions expressed as
individual and collective emotions, feelings, moods and
sentiments, grouped into five affect clusters on the basis
of their situational andmotivational state appraisals. The
richness of our data suggests that using a few discrete
emotion labels to identify citizens as ‘angry’, ‘afraid’, ‘or
‘enthusiastic’, ignores more nuanced expressions of indi-
vidual and collective affect. In addition limiting the affec-
tive content of concepts to ‘positive’ and ‘negative,’ does
not do justice to citizens’ complex affective worlds.
Our first CAM examined the origins of all affective
mentions and showed that they were linked to a variety
of political objects: political leaders and parties, religion,
current affairs, issues such as individual rights and free-
doms, oppression, and social and political stability versus
change (Figure 1). Next, we analysed each affect cluster
separately and identified the concepts linked specifically
to each one (Figures 2 through 6). Our aim was to exam-
inewhether affective reactions originate froma common
core of concepts or differ in content based on their ap-
praisal dimension.
Our second and third CAMs examined motive con-
sistent affect like pride, admiration, joy and hope. Fig-
ures 2 and 3 show them linked with favourable ideo-
logical orientations and party preferences. The justifi-
cations offered by the interview participants regarding
the way they felt pointed to motive consistent ideolog-
ical orientations and objects congruent with their pref-
erences and vote choices. Figures 4, 5 and 6 highlight
the particularities of motive inconsistent affect, and its
links with unfavourable ideological orientations, issues
and political actors. On the whole, we noticed that par-
ticipants reported affect that span across the five dimen-
sions confirming our theoretical expectations. In addi-
tion, their affective experiences were rich and at times
ambivalent. For example symbols like the flag or the pic-
ture of Ataturk inspired pride but also worry, the AKP
governance tactics were a source of hope but also anger,
actions that undermine democracy were linked to anger,
fear, worry and disappointment.
Focusing specifically on motive consistent affect, we
expected that gain-related and loss-avoidance affectiv-
ity would have different origins (Figure 2 and 3 respec-
tively). Motive consistent, gain-related affective expres-
sions such as pride, joy and enthusiasm,werementioned
28 times mostly for the Turkish flag and/or the picture
of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Figure 2). They were also
linked to secularization and modernization values, the
nation, and ideological party preferences. More specif-
ically, eleven participants reported feeling proud when
looking at the Turkish flag, considering it a significant
Figure 1.Map of concepts linked to political affectivity.
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symbol for them and the society. Four AKP supporters
viewed it as a national symbol of unity, combinedwith re-
ligion. Two MHP supporters focused on the significance
of the flag for Turkish citizens and national unity. For six
CHP supporters the flag brought pride and admiration for
the secularist ideas it represents.
Motive consistent, gain-related pride appeared in
complex interactions with motive inconsistent affect.
Four participants indifferent about the flag or the picture
of Ataturk when they were in Turkey, felt pride when see-
ing them abroad. For some others, the excessive use of
both symbols generated anger and disappointment. Oth-
ers experienced ambivalence: nine noted that although
they felt proud for the Turkish flag and the picture of
Ataturk, their excessive use created negative feelings. In
the words of P5:
Especially in the last years you can see the flag pretty
much everywhere. Although I am proud to be Turk,
seeing the flag in every place doesn’t make me feel
comfortable. You know it resembles with very nega-
tive situations where the flag dominates all spheres
of life.
Motive consistent loss-avoidance considerations giving
rise to hope, were mentioned 16 times, and linked to op-
posing government practices, supporting freedoms and
rights, and future economic development (Figure 3). AKP
supporters hoped that conservative AKP forces (repre-
senting the Islamists) would not dominate the party and
the country’s future, and that AKP would continue the
positive change in society and harmonize social relations,
‘ending the domination of conservative Kemalists’. The
country’s economic development under the AKP rule
also created hope among these participants. For AKP op-
ponents however, hope had a different meaning. Charac-
teristically one participant (P1) noted:
To walk down the streets promoting our rights…it’s
the only hope we have left and the only tool we have
against Erdoğan and AKP.
Ten CHP supporters felt hopeful when discussing the role
of CHP’s socio-democratic agenda as the sole opposition
to AKP. Two MHP voters were hopeful that their party
leader (Bahçeli) would enhance the party’s position as
a constructive opposition to the AKP. Two extreme-left
supporters, disappointed with Turkish politics hoped for
the creation of a new party to be the real oppositional
force against the AKP governance.
Next, we turned to motive inconsistent affectivity
(Figures 3, 4 and 5). All three motive inconsistent af-
fective clusters (aversive, anxious and loss-related) were
linked to state control and oppression; violation of indi-
vidual rights and freedoms; the policies, agenda and in-
fluence of AKP; actions that undermine democracy; the
Figure 2.Map of motive consistent gain-related affect.
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Figure 3.Map of motive consistent loss-avoidance related affect.
future of the country; past religious oppression; oppo-
sitional ideologies and societal polarization. This high-
lights the value of the question we posed early on:
what are themechanisms and origins that underlie affec-
tive phenomena.
Looking specifically at the map of aversive affect
in Figure 4, anger, frustration, annoyance, rage and ir-
ritation were mentioned 113 times, in discussions of
dominant ideologies, key political actors, certain policies,
democratic principles and individual freedoms and rights
as well as state-generated oppression.
About 17 participants expressed aversion for the
dominant ideological orientations and their key political
advocators. They disliked the AKP attempts to promote
the party as agent of conservative neoliberalism while
violating individual rights and freedoms. Two were frus-
trated with the AKP Islamist agenda and the aim ‘to con-
vert the Turkish state into a conservative Islamic state’.
Four were angry with the control of the judiciary, theme-
dia and the armed forces. Kemalist supporters disliked
the ‘false promises about democracy’, the ‘limitation of
personal freedoms and rights’, and the increased role of
religion. According to P23 (CHP voter):
I get really angry when I hear that AKP is a party pro-
moting human rights and freedom. Come on. AKP is
a party that has taken a series of measures that go
against public rights and freedoms in the name of
its religious conservative agenda. It is governing the
country by oppressing individuals, reducing our free-
doms and generating a widespread feeling of fear.
Five were angry with conservatives’ disapproval of pub-
lic behaviours like drinking orwomen smoking, and three
mentioned individual rights restrictionswith examples of
friends or relatives being under investigation or prose-
cuted. Six were averse to AKP’s power to silence oppo-
sitional voices, and five were frustrated with the ‘never-
ending conflict’ between supporters of political Islam
and Kemalism. The socio-political environment and the
pressure from political Islam and Kemalismwere sources
of anger, and also loss-related affect like deep disappoint-
ment, sadness and pessimism about the future of Turkey.
We see here clear evidence of affective experiences span-
ning across the motive inconsistent clusters.
Two participants were angry with fanatic supporters
of both sides. As P1 said:
‘Kemalists that shout at women with headscarves’,
‘making tattoos with Ataturk’s signatures’; ‘the police
[following the government’s orders] targets people
that drink beer on the streets’.
Three AKP supporters were angry at CHP and Kemal-
ist forces that historically imposed rules of life and op-
pressed religious segments. A CHP supporter felt angry
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Figure 4.Map of motive inconsistent aversive affect.
because in the past citizens lived together but since 2005
tolerance decreased and polarization increased. 17 par-
ticipants with divergent ideologies supported religious
freedoms and the placement of religion in the private
sphere, and the high levels of religiosity generated aver-
sive emotions. Four socio-democrats CHP voters did not
see the Islamic culture and traditions as posing a danger
to the country and democracy, but expressed anger and
frustration wanting religion to remain a private matter
and society to be open for the individual expression of re-
ligious beliefs. TwoAKP supporters acknowledged the im-
portance of religion in Turkey, yet noted that all citizens
should have religious freedom of expression. AKP sup-
porters also expressed anger and annoyance against the
past religious oppression generated by Kemalist elites.
As we saw earlier, symbols like the Turkish flag and
pictures of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were linked to aver-
sive affect in addition to pride. Six noted the extensive
use of both symbols in spaces such as banks, shops,
restaurants and schools, which makes citizens feel that
these are ‘holy untouchable symbols’ (P1) and that hav-
ing the flag ‘in every corner makes you feel that some-
one is trying to impose on you a sense of national iden-
tification’ (P17). One AKP supporter and one anarcho-
communist said that having the picture of Ataturk was
undemocratic and closer to dictatorial systems. Two AKP
voters felt angry seeing pictures of Ataturk everywhere
although they respected the ideology he represented,
while a nationalist MHP supporter felt angry with the
Kurdish BDP:
BDP is under the control of PKK. It makes me very an-
gry to know that a party is allowed to propagate in sup-
port of a terrorist organisation and play a legitimate
role in politics. (P14)
For CHP and extreme-left supporters, aversive affect was
also linked to value preferences towards individual free-
doms and liberties and the role of women in society.
They expressed angerwhen talking aboutmandatorymil-
itary service, violence and attacks against LGTB people,
social policies towards women in general, the enforce-
ment of power and open provocations against opposi-
tional voices, the expanding role of religion, the increase
of Imam Hatip schools over secular education, and polit-
ical life in general because ‘there are no choices left for
us anymore’ (P1).
Motive inconsistent anxious affectivity was mapped
in Figure 5. It was expressed as fear, worry, concern, anx-
iety, uncertainty and insecurity was mentioned 45 times
often in combination with aversive and loss-related af-
fectivity when discussing the political Islam-Kemalist con-
flict, the AKP domination, restrictions of freedom and in-
dividual rights, the AKP influence on the police and se-
curity forces, and the future of democracy. Items linked
primarily to anxiety were minority and women’s rights,
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Figure 5.Map of motive inconsistent anxious affect.
the Syrian crisis, terrorism, fanaticism, and concerns over
national unity. Ideological leanings were again important
for these experiences.
Three extreme-left participants expressed fear to-
wards fanatic Kemalists and political Islamists voting for
CHP and AKP respectively, who ‘legitimize social polar-
ization and undermine the country’s democratic estab-
lishment’. Another source of anxious feelings was social
and political instability identifying specific social groups
as threats (Kemalists, hard-line Islamists, Kurds, terrorist
groups), depending on the participants’ ideological and
political orientation. According to P2:
Whoever wants to change the current situation and
impose their own reality can play a significant destabil-
ising role for Turkey. And these groups are many and
too dangerous.
Citizens were also afraid of the high polarization, were
anxious about the way social conflicts will unfold socially
and politically, and tensions among friends, colleagues
and family. An AKP supporter (P19) feared that once the
economic state of Turkey starts ‘the downward slide then
tolerance will definitely collapse and underlying prob-
lems that are currently hidden will come to the surface’.
CHP and extreme-left participants were scared to follow
modern European-like lifestyles mentioning violations of
individual rights and freedoms and state control over cit-
izens, the AKP’s oppression and the consequences for ex-
pressing views, beliefs or ideas that oppose the govern-
ment and its status quo.
Uncertainty about the future of democracy wasmen-
tioned by two participants who worried about the in-
creasing influence of the AKP government on security
forces and the police. They had experienced fear of/or
prosecution directly (themselves) or indirectly (their
friends) andworried about the role of the police towards
those that express dissent against the government or
the Prime Minister. Two AKP supporters also expressed
worry about the party’s administration and future plans,
and noted that by securing a healthy economy, social
life would improve. CHP and extreme-left supporters ex-
pressed worry and uncertainty for the inability of other
political agents to play a decisive role against AKP. As
P23 noted:
I’m very worried about the future of democracy in
Turkey. AKP has a very strong support and it seems
that themore power they get themore invasive there
are in the society with their practices.
Six female AKP opponents reported fears about Turkey’s
increasing Islamization and its impact on women. Four
male extreme-left supporters and CHP voters were also
afraid of compromises to women’s rights to abortion.
Eight AKP opponents expressed fear and concern for
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the country’s future because of the increasing power
acquired by Erdoğan and ‘Turkey turning into a dicta-
torship’. A similar fear (concern for the future) was ex-
pressed by two liberal AKP supporters.
Finally we examined motive inconsistent loss-related
affect in Figure 6. Itwas expressed as disappointment, dis-
trust, and pessimism, mentioned by 21 participants, and
appeared often alongside aversive and anxious affect.
AKP opponents expressed deep disappointment and
pessimism about the increasing role of Islam, freedoms
and human rights undermined by the AKP governance.
As one participant noted:
I don’t have trust for my future. Not anymore. I am
even thinking of moving abroad maybe to Germany
where I already have some family members. I amwor-
ried about how things will unfold; and what worries
me the most is that no one feels free anymore to ex-
press opposition or an alternative position. If there
was a healthy dialogue among political actors that
would be one thing but when you lose that then you
lose your hope.
7. Discussion
Our interviews in 2012 in Turkey point to complex af-
fective experiences, which were neither static nor singu-
lar. Hope, pride, joy, anger, irritation, frustration, fear,
worry, anxiety, uncertainty, sadness and disappointment
were felt towards a variety of political objects, in com-
plex blends and sometimes ambivalent systems. Our af-
fective maps indicate the diverse sources of affect, draw-
ing on considerations of religious or civic freedom, ex-
pressions of hope towards change and the strengthen-
ing of current conditions, anxious reactions towards se-
curity, the present and the unknown, disappointment for
the state of democracy, pride for national symbols, and
joy for how far the country has come. We also learned
that affect aligned with ideological inclinations, confirm-
ing our hypothesis that emotions are differentiated by
the appraisals of the events that trigger them. Based on
the above, we think it is not meaningful for empirical
models to split citizens intomainly angry, afraid or happy
groups. Obtaining a deep understanding of what citizens
think, feel and want allows for a better grasp not only of
themechanism that moves individual political behaviour
but also of political process itself.
A critical examination of our study recognizes cer-
tain limitations. The small sample size does not allow
us to perform powerful statistical analysis and signifi-
cance testing. In addition, because our sample was non-
probabilistic the findings are not representative of the
Turkish population. This is counter-balanced by being
able to uncover the underexplored complexities of po-
litical affectivity. This study invites further investigations
with larger interview samples, which will challenge sim-
Figure 6.Map of motive inconsistent loss-related affect.
Politics and Governance, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 144–158 153
plified approaches to emotions, and complement evi-
dence on the significance of affect currently on offer by
standard public opinion surveys.
By analysing our interview data with CAMs we were
able to produce comparable maps of political concepts
related to the expression of affectivity in Turkey. We
focused on situational state (motive consistency versus
inconsistency) and motivational state (gain or loss) ap-
praisals to identify key affect-clusters. Future studies can
expand to appraisals of power, legitimacy and agency.
They can also measure appraisals directly, by asking par-
ticipants to rate the event that caused their emotion on
indicators of the hypothesized appraisals. For example,
legitimacy predictions of a positive deserving outcome
is characteristic of anger, but also pride, joy and hope,
while a negative deserving outcome is characteristic of
guilt (Scherer, 1988).
Our interview data allowed us to study naturally oc-
curring affects recorded in the interviews rather than
laboratory-induced emotions. So while authenticity is
high, we are not able to test causal hypotheses. Experi-
mentally induced emotions, moods or sentiments would
have lower ecological validity butwould gain in control of
the scenarios manipulated. Experimental studies would
be excellently suited to test the cause-effect links be-
tween specific event appraisals and their affective reac-
tions (Capelos, 2013).
With the above in mind, the next step is to extend
and replicate these findings using larger interview sam-
ples. Once the representativeness of the results is estab-
lished, experimental and computational simulation mod-
els can test hypotheses about the role of specific affec-
tive clusters and their related appraisals on evaluations
of specific political objects. Another promising and hith-
erto neglected area is to examine whether similar pat-
terns are evident in group discussions and focus-group
activities. This would allow for interesting comparisons
between individual and collective affective experiences.
8. Conclusion
Since our 2012 interviews, Turkey has undergone a se-
ries of events that placed the country in an extended
state of emergency that lasted for 2 years and left signif-
icant marks in the country’s social and political spheres.
Following Gezi and the 2016 attempted coup, the state
launched a massive crackdown targeting all oppositional
voices. This resulted in the arrest of thousands of civil
servants from the armed forces, as well as teachers,
academics, health workers and media representatives
over alleged links with the Gülen movement. Many non-
governmental organisations working on human rights
and individual freedoms were banned and closed down
and political figures were imprisoned, on alleged connec-
tions with terrorist organisations (see the arrested mem-
bers of the pro-Kurdish HDP).
A few studies looked at the recent changes in the pub-
lic sphere offering insights into the way that the public
and in particular activists organize and act (Bee, 2017;
Bee & Kaya, 2017). Several scholars have pointed to the
creation of new social dynamics that relax the clear-cut
boundaries of secularism-Islamism (Acar & Uluğ, 2016;
Bayramoğlu, 2009; Damar, 2016; Turam, 2015). The 2013
and 2016 political developments generated a new wave
of strong emotions that shook again the social and po-
litical life of Turkey. Public sovereignty, democratic prin-
ciples and individual rights and freedoms served as key
mobilising agents, pointing to deep-rooted divisions and
polarization even as the secularism-Islamism boundaries
have become more fluid (Bayramoğlu, 2009; Capelos
& Chrona, 2012; Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007; Göle, 2013;
Turam, 2015).
A working hypothesis for future research is that
the country’s increasing authoritarianism outstrips the
relaxed boundaries across existing divisions, reiterat-
ing and reinforcing new types of polarisation founded
on traditionally oppositional ideologies. As Akarca and
Başlevent (2011) put it, cultural, ethnic and socio-
economic elements that bring together segments of the
population can create clear-cut divisions in the country’s
public sphere. Our findings suggest that ideological orien-
tations shape different affective worlds; this could be the
key for understanding how citizens negotiate their polit-
ical identities amidst the current turbulent environment,
and warrants further investigation.
We close with an invitation for the rigorous, com-
prehensive and systematic study of political affectivity.
Moving beyond a handful of discrete emotions, towards
a careful examination of the cognitive representations
of specific affect clusters allows us to engage seriously
with the content of expression of anger, hope, pride, joy,
irritation, fear, worry, concern disappointment, loss in
the Turkish context and beyond. Here we identified con-
siderations that set these emotions apart, and others
that connect them, as they form rich affective experi-
ences. Evidence that emotionsmatter abounds, in recent
studies that examine UK’s Brexit, Trump’s reactionary
America, anti-globalization and anti-elite populist narra-
tives, challenges of European integration, the gained sup-
port of far right, extreme and radical movements and
parties, energy and climate change debates, the drivers
and consequences of international crises of migration,
the emotional economy of austerity politics, the internal
functioning of international institutions (see Capelos &
Katsanidou, 2018; Salmela & von Scheve, 2017; and in
this issue Koschut, 2018; Palm, 2018; Sanchez Salgado,
2018; Skonieczny, 2018; Weber, 2018).
We found that affective reactions in 2012 in Turkey
were rich, interconnected, ideologically consistent, and
linked to evaluations of multiple political objects. Re-
search on political affect can contribute to the in-depth
study of intergroup and intercultural relations as well as
current and future political developments in these heated
times. Importantly, it can offer insights into the impact
and viability of specific political models and practices in
contemporary developed and developing democracies.
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